

THEATER LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT: A CASE FOR A JOINT DISTRIBUTION SOLUTION

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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by

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ABSTRACT

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This project examines joint theater logistics challenges faced by Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) and Joint Force Commanders (JFC). It explores the factors affecting theater distribution and joint theater logistics management including Joint Reception Staging Onward Movement and Integration (JRSOI) operations. The paper reviews historical problem areas crossing strategic and operational boundaries of logistical support. The failure to establish a single, integrated joint logistics organization to manage and coordinate theater-level logistics has consistently resulted in theater distribution problems that have plagued many U.S. military operations. Recommendations offer alternative solutions to achieve bona-fide, joint logistics management control. The paper also discusses expanding roles for, joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) integration using existing military logistics organizations to achieve the sustainment capabilities of Focused Logistics.

THEATER LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT: A CASE FOR A JOINT DISTRIBUTION SOLUTION

The end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed, and trained, the whole objective of his sleeping, eating, drinking, and marching is simply that he should fight at the right place and the right time.

—Maj. Gen. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (1832)

The reduction of materiel inventories and increasing emphasis on Joint Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational (JIIM) operations necessitate creating joint-multinational-based distribution management centers which effectively manage materiel flow in theaters of operation. Restructuring service organizations which manage joint theater logistics will enable the United States (U.S.) to master the dynamic complexity of the nonlinear, digital battlefield and facilitate support for demands of materiel not readily available in most Theaters of Operations (TO).

This paper examines the current, joint logistics challenges faced by Combatant Commanders (CCDR) and Joint Force Commanders (JFC). It will outline problem areas, crossing along strategic and operational boundaries of logistical support. Additionally, the paper will discuss alternative solutions which support the expanding, joint missions using existing military logistics organizations to achieve the sustainment capabilities of Focused Logistics.

The tenets of Focused Logistics and Joint Theater Logistics Management (JTLM) initiatives first described in Joint Vision 2020 provided the initial road map to the development of joint military logistics and its organizations.¹ However, despite the strides in JTLM under defense transformation, the current vision and transformation of logistics forces do not go far enough; faster, more evolutionary changes are required. Why change now? Failure to take action to change military logistics force structures and

processes will continue to propagate inefficiencies, redundancies, and will consistently result in theater logistics problems that have plagued many U.S. military operations in the past.

History is full of examples where nations' attempts to hold existing advantages have succumbed to disastrous results.² Today's security environment continues to evolve with U.S. Armed Forces facing both symmetric and asymmetric challenges. Since the inception of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the U.S. military has significantly improved its ability to conduct joint operations.³ The integration of joint war-fighting capability continues to advance, establishing the U.S. military as the most potent military force in the world. However, even with all the advances in joint operations, we must continue to examine the force structure of joint military logistics at all levels. The persistent threat of terrorism and potential use of weapons of mass destruction further compel the U.S. to change. An evolutionary change in military logistics structure could effectively boost combat power immediately and, more importantly, form a more responsive logistics architecture consistent with the guidance in the National Military Strategy.⁴ In taking the next step in the evolution of military logistics we can leverage the elements of national power to better support joint operations.

Evolution of Expeditionary Joint Theater Logistics

Ever since the U.S. deployment in the Spanish-American War, our combat forces have experienced a constant and consistent pattern of problems projecting logistics to sustain deployed forces.⁵ Many countries can deploy a force with its Unit Basic Load (UBL), but very few can sustain their forces for prolonged periods in undeveloped

theaters with no host nation support or a functioning, logistical network. The U.S. military's ability to deploy and sustain forces is a critical force multiplier that few countries can replicate. For example in 1990, the U.S. deployed seven brigades, three Carrier Battle Groups, fourteen Tactical Fighter Squadrons, four C-130 Squadrons, and a Patriot Air Defense Artillery unit 8000 miles in a three-week period to support Operation Desert Shield.⁶

Nevertheless, an examination of various military operations highlights the necessity for an evolution in joint military logistics. Lessons learned from Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm (ODS/ODS), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and other contingency operations found there was no established or recognized distribution management process within the Services. Furthermore, the inadequacy of joint logistics distribution reporting left decision makers with insufficient information to control the logistical distribution system.⁷

During ODS/ODS the U.S. shipped over 40,000 containers and airlifted 250,000 463L pallets to Southwest Asia between 1990 and March 1991.⁸ The movement of massive supplies, equipment, and personnel into the theater and their subsequent distribution throughput in theater was a logistical triumph. The operation also demonstrated America's rapid capability to project combat power anywhere in the world. However, as the operation continued, the inherent weakness of the intra-theater logistical distribution management link became clear. The logistical support structure responsible to control and move supplies from the air/seaports of debarkation to the using units was neither equipped nor manned to manage the volume of equipment, supplies, medical materiel, mail, and other cargo shipped to the area of operation.

The further strategic challenges encountered during OEF in Afghanistan tested the U.S. deployment and distribution networks. Afghanistan's land-locked geography, tremendous distances over substantial lines of communication, and limited infrastructure, provided enormous distribution difficulties to logistics planners. The initial lack of collaborative planning with the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) compounded the problem.⁹ USTRANSCOM, as the Functional Combatant Commander (FCC) responsible for strategic movement of Department of Defense cargo, maximizes the distribution network selecting the mode of transport, e.g. air, sea or surface, and resources, e.g. commercial, military or combination, to fulfill the Combatant Commander's requirements efficiently. Coordination with the Department of State and U.S. military country teams is essential to obtain diplomatic overflight clearances as well as sea and airport access. Countries with which there are no existing agreements or favorable relations can make access problematic.¹⁰

The subsequent, strategic and operational dimension of OIF supply distribution has highlighted continued, long-standing weaknesses in Department of Defense (DOD) supply-chain management. In particular, the Army and Marines noted problems with the delivery of supplies to their war-fighters during OIF. DOD efforts to develop and institute joint theater logistics is largely fragmented due to a lack of specific goals and strategies, accountability for achieving results, and outcome-oriented performance measures.¹¹ Joint theater logistics' initiatives are key components to improve distribution and supply support for deployed forces.

Defense Resourcing and Joint Military Logistics

During the past decade, the U.S. Armed Forces have seen drastic changes spanning manpower, force readiness, and funding that have both adversely affected and enhanced U.S. military operations. Our Cold War victories over the Soviet Union, current, and future threats have precipitated reassessment of the U.S. Armed Forces' missions and resourcing. The centerpiece of U.S. military strategy is our ability to project forces. We can no longer afford to maintain the enormous materiel stockpiles of yesterday. The advent of new technology, privatization, and streamlining of our logistical business practices will play a vital role in resolving joint military logistics problems while shaping the Joint Logistics Environment (JLE).

The DOD and private industry have realized the benefits of "right sizing" their inventory levels. For example, the total annual carrying cost of maintaining warehouse inventory is often within the range of 20 to 25 percent of the total inventory's value.¹² As a result, DOD supply centers have followed the private sector in streamlining their inventories. A review of the DOD principal supply systems' inventories reflects the reduction of inventory values since Fiscal Year (FY) 1991 from \$203.4 billion down to \$101 billion in FY 2006.¹³ This fact, coupled with improved transportation and distribution capability, has resulted in reduced inventory levels in all the National Inventory Control Points (NICPs) and tactical Supply Support Activities (SSAs) in DOD. One significant qualifier is that these smaller inventories at all echelons did have a negative impact during OEF I and OIF I.

The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is the DOD principal, wholesale activity and link to the national industrial base. DLA process improvements have modernized its systems, improving customer support through a number of business enterprise-related

initiatives. The Business Systems Modernization initiative is transforming how DLA conducts its logistics operations. This modernization initiative seeks the eventual replacement of DLA's legacy logistics materiel management systems with commercial, off-the-shelf software.¹⁴ Similarly, the Direct Vendor Delivery (DVD) Program provides DLA customers rapid delivery of critical repair parts. Direct Vendor Delivery is a DLA arrangement with suppliers that allows customers to receive items from the suppliers directly, instead of DLA receiving the items first and then distributing them to the customers. Although DLA does not take delivery of the items in many cases, it still monitors the delivery performance of the suppliers, and it is also involved in the Direct Vendor Delivery planning and procurement processes.¹⁵ Internet network connectivity has also revolutionized the requisitioning and In-Transit Visibility (ITV) process, producing near real-time data. The combinations of such programs and other successful initiatives have yielded improved Customer Wait Time (CWT) for requisitions.

However, many of these enablers become problematic for joint forces deployed in undeveloped theaters with poor infrastructures. In most cases the greatest challenge resides in the complete distribution and management of materiel from factory (strategic level) to foxhole (tactical level). Moreover, increased efficiency alone cannot solve all the challenges.

Joint Military Logistics Distribution Challenges

Among the myriad of joint military logistics challenges, the Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI) process is one of the most difficult to overcome. Managing JRSOI at ports of embarkation and debarkation becomes particularly challenging with congestion, often resulting in sidetracked shipments.

Without centralized management, the multi-service, stove-piped logistical systems lose visibility of equipment and location. Delays of critically-needed supplies commonly occur due to improper or insufficient documentation and centralized management.

The JRSOI process is a critical piece of force projection; JRSOI enables U.S. warfighting organizations to buildup combat power and sustainment assets.¹⁶ JRSOI is both a preeminent operational and logistics function which is influenced by a lack of integration within the joint construct. Therefore, integrating theater-level logistics into joint operations must be a top priority in leveraging joint capabilities, other national elements of power, and coalition partners. Considering the many, diverse force missions currently undertaken across the globe, such as military support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO), the U.S. must tailor its military logistics force structure to support full spectrum operations. Directives such as DOD 3000.5 provide the impetus for change in guiding a much-needed restructuring of joint logistics to support core U.S. military missions.¹⁷

Desert Storm was a superb opportunity to validate U.S. joint theater logistics doctrine. However, the U.S. Central Command decided against activating the supporting 377th Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM). This decision resulted in an ad-hoc logistics organization that conducted theater logistics.¹⁸ Other examples of similar, ad-hoc theater logistics management organizations operated in Somalia, Rwanda, Kuwait (1994), Haiti, and Bosnia.¹⁹ The establishment of ad-hoc logistics organizations managing theater logistics has consistently caused problems controlling distribution and management of logistics. These ad-hoc organizations have been reactive and have resorted to large-scale improvisation to meet logistics requirements

due to their very nature. This problem, coupled with the principles of joint doctrine calling for the integration of sustainment efforts, has initiated a multitude of studies in order to improve theater logistics.²⁰

Management or Joint Logistics Distribution Problem?

Various findings from both joint and service-sponsored reviews have noted shortcomings at both the strategic and operational levels. The lack of synergy or unity of command and/or effort adversely impacts the overall operational effectiveness of the logistics system. In a U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) study released in December 2003, GAO noted failures to apply lessons learned from Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and other military operations. These may have contributed to the logistics support problems encountered during OIF. Previous GAO reports, as well as DOD and military service after-action reports have documented similar problems that occurred in OIF.²¹ Specifically, relevant, noted logistics and distribution problems in the GAO report on OIF include:

1. A backlog of hundreds of pallets and containers of materiel at various distribution points due to transportation constraints and inadequate asset visibility.
2. Discrepancy of \$1.2 billion between the amount of materiel shipped to Army activities in the theater of operations and the amount of materiel that those activities acknowledged they received.
3. Potential cost to DOD of millions of dollars for late fees on leased containers or replacement of DOD-owned containers due to distribution backlogs or losses.
4. The cannibalization of vehicles and potential reduction of equipment readiness

due to the unavailability of parts that either were not in DOD's inventory or inadequate asset visibility failed to locate them. The unavailability of parts is likely attributed to errant logistical reporting, compounded by material management inventory decisions on theater stocks.²²

5. The duplication of many requisitions and circumvention of the supply system as a result of inadequate asset visibility and lack of trust.

6. Accumulation at the theater distribution center in Kuwait of hundreds of pallets, containers, and boxes of excess supplies and equipment shipped from units redeploying from Iraq without required content descriptions and shipping documentation.

At the operational level, the lack of clear lines of authority and management among the Services compounded the distribution management problem. The common thread between each of the noted GAO failures is the lack of a defined joint, theater logistics command or management capability. An *Army Logistician* magazine article titled, "Joint Logistics for the EUCOM AOR", examines the issue.²³ The author summarizes four of these problem areas related to logistics command and control that impact theater logistics:

1. Absence of a joint logistics organization to execute joint logistics functions in support of the theater. The execution of sustainment functions is typically characterized by "ad hocery" and discovery learning.

2. The combatant commander (CCDR) is overall responsible for theater-level logistics functions, but no subordinate commander is designated to execute the mission. A joint theater logistics commander is required to fill the void of JTLM command and

control. This action would free the CCDR and the command's J-4 to plan, establish logistics policy, and coordinate sustainment operations.

3. Inability to execute Directive Authority For Logistics (DAFL). DAFL is a unique authority of the CCDR's authority to exercise directive authority for logistics through subordinate commanders. A logistics command and control organization is central to making the CCDR DAFL more authoritative, rather than just a staff function.

4. The ability of the CCDR to project requirements and respond with appropriate, timely capabilities.

Despite the progress in joint operations and doctrine, the necessity for change in joint military logistics has become increasingly pressing. The U.S. must ensure joint logistics transformation keeps pace with the changes of today's dynamic operating environment.

Joint Military Logistics

The best argument to restructure military logistics lies in U.S. joint doctrine. Joint doctrine dictates that the responsibility to establish and maintain an effective theater logistical system belongs to the CCDR, who also possesses DAFL.²⁴ By law, each service has Title 10 responsibilities to ensure its component of the Joint Task Force (JTF) is manned, equipped, trained, and sustained. The task to plan theater Lines Of Communications (LOCs) and oversee JRSOI in the combatant commander's Area of Operations (AO) principally belongs to the CCDRs J-4, who provides policy guidance to theater subordinate commands and recommendations to the CCDR.

The CCDR has three primary options available to organize the theater logistics support structure. The first option is to have each Service provide logistics support in

accordance with its executive agent responsibilities, Title 10, Operations Plans (OPLAN), and Operations Orders (OPORD). The second option is to designate a lead Service as the logistics provider for joint forces in the theater with augmentation from the other Services. The third option is to establish a Joint Theater Logistics Management (JTLM) organization to synchronize movement and materiel, thus integrating the logistics capabilities of the joint force.²⁵

In fact, until recently, there were few instances where a specific, joint, functional organization was responsible to plan and operate the theater LOCs, a task assigned to the dominant user in the AO. JFC's in Afghanistan have elected to pursue the formation of a specific functional Joint Logistics Command (JLC) since 2003, consistently a U.S. Army logistics unit. The JLC plans, executes sustainment operations, and conducts JTLM for OEF units. While this example relates to a JFC in a JOA, and not a CDR in a Geographic Combatant Command (GCC), the concept and principles are applicable for the Combatant-Command level.

Historically, the Army component, as the largest element of a joint contingency force in an AO, is delegated the mission to execute the JRSOI functions.²⁶ Similarly, the President, Secretary of Defense, and Congress have assigned the Army a significant number of executive agent responsibilities for logistics functions in both peace and wartime.²⁷ As a result of these legal requirements and increased, centralized, land-warfare logistics requirements, the Army originally established the Support Command (SUPCOM) which subsequently transformed to the Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM) and over time to the current Theater Sustainment Command (TSC)

structure. The TSC is responsible to support the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) and execute theater logistics responsibilities.

The U.S. Army's TSC's robust staff organizational structure and capability to manage theater-level logistics make it the ideal candidate for a joint-based distribution management center. In fact, with the appropriate joint manning and resourcing to conduct joint-based distribution management in the JLE, it could overcome statutory limitations imposed by Title X.

This fragmented approach to theater logistics and JRSOI have resulted in inefficiencies that adversely impact, effective, joint warfighting, core missions. Currently, U.S. Army Echelon Above Brigade (EAB) formations conduct all the theater logistics for major operations. The other Services simply do not have a robust logistics organization capable of supporting a theater-level logistics system for extended operations. The only exception is the Navy's Seabased Logistics; however, it is presently limited by an inland restriction of 200 miles due to a lack of transportation assets and experience.²⁸ For this reason the consolidation of Army EAB, logistical units into the joint military logistics support structure provides a critical solution to conduct truly joint, operational logistics, and to facilitate theater-strategic level logistics.

The proposal to establish a functional logistics command to manage the JLE has initiated much controversy within each of the respective Service logistics communities. Creation of a joint military logistics structure primarily led and operated by Army logisticians may not be very appealing to the other Services. An Army lead, based on the predominance of its logistics forces, could potentially influence future joint logistical doctrine. Regardless of the success of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Services' never-

ending battles for limited resources and funding will continue due to focus on current roles and missions within their domains of air, land, and sea in an environment anticipating shrinking budgets. Establishing a functional logistics command could negatively affect the core competencies of Service strategic and operational organizations, impacting their inherent sustainment function capabilities. This initiative could perhaps affect Service sustainment doctrine, funding, and potentially capabilities such as battlefield system repair or replacement. Similarly, some senior logisticians might perceive that this reorganization is the first step to unification under a Joint Logistics Command and centralized management of Service programs, which many oppose, not to mention possible Title X constraints.

A Single Defense Logistics System Solution?

The U.S. Armed Forces could painstakingly restructure or overhaul the entire military logistics system for the future. Consolidation of all levels (e.g. strategic, operational, and tactical) of the defense logistics structure could combine into one functional command such as the U.S. Logistics Command (USLOGCOM).²⁹ The fragmented nature of logistics management prompted the Secretary of Defense to task the Defense Business Practice Implementation Board to provide recommendations on whether to consolidate the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). The potential merging of the two organizations is at the forefront of debate by logistics experts who seek a single, integrated organization for supply and transportation, which could strengthen DOD's strategic logistics capability. Unfortunately, the Board recommended not combining the two organizations, primarily due to their diverse roles, missions, and competencies.³⁰

Nonetheless, the most radical and cost-effective option in the long term is to consolidate the defense logistics system at all levels. Although this alternative is most risky, it could free \$20 billion a year for important investments in warfighting technologies or other systems.³¹ It could also lead to improve further interoperability of equipment through greater centralized management and refinement of logistical support doctrine for all the Services. The merging of strategic organizations such as DLA with Service operational and theater-strategic level logistics forces would provide unity of command and effort.

A more holistic approach to military logistics in general would greatly benefit all the Services, while still also maintaining the unique differences required for supporting the Air Force and Navy. Centralized management at all levels would enhance potential efficiencies and reduce systemic redundancies. Conversely, this option could have an extremely disruptive effect on the business practices of each of the Services, such as repair of repairables, funding, and logistical support doctrine. In this option, most likely the Army, the Service with the greatest demand, could have a greater influence on the military logistical system. The situation could then result in a zero-sum system of winners and losers, leading to catastrophic results for the other Services.

However, such radical approaches in the near-term are dangerous and unrealistic for a nation at war. Conducting major restructuring of logistics forces while sustaining the Global War On Terror (GWOT), while hindered by current fiscal constraints, would incur huge risk.

Another approach worthy of consideration is to consolidate functional Service logistics organizations at the operational and theater-strategic levels only. This option is

less chaotic than forcing joint integration within the Services and of strategic, combat support agencies. The two approaches demonstrate a substantial leap of progress toward streamlining the system and achieving the National Military Strategy's Focused Logistics goals.

The consolidation of military logistics at the operational and theater-strategic levels provides a revolutionary approach and represents a significant shift from Service parochialism. This option provides several advantages, including potential cost savings from the consolidation, improved interoperability of equipment and personnel services, maximizing resources, and prioritization. The U.S. Navy has recognized the cost saving by reducing its logistics forces. In recent years it has privatized much of its underway replenishment capability by passing the mission to the Military Sealift Command (MSC).³² Granted, the consolidation would reduce flexibility and autonomy in the application of their respective, operational, logistics forces. The option may appear too restrictive to the Services; however, existing joint doctrine is already moving in this direction.

Finally, restructuring existing military logistics forces, emphasizing joint integration within the Services and combat support agencies incrementally, is a slower, more deliberate approach to transform the Services' logistics system. The current system provides each of the military Services maximum flexibility to develop their service-specific logistical support doctrine and field required equipment as needed. This approach has proven successful in the past and gives the Services time to validate joint logistics doctrine in a more methodical manner. Additionally, it supports the gradual

professional development of multi-functional and multi-service logisticians responsible for the sustainment of operations in the 21st-century operating environment.

The problem with this approach is it fails to take advantage or go far enough to achieve truly precision logistics. Substantive reform must come soon, otherwise the Services will continue to foster inefficiencies and waste precious resources. Ultimately, any approach to streamline military logistics that involves restructuring of forces is bound to be contentious for the military Services.

A Joint Logistics Solution

In January 2004, USTRANSCOM deployed the Central Command Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (CDDOC), designed around the Joint Movement Center structure resident in the Combatant Command's J-4. The CDDOC initiative developed through the efforts of U.S. Transportation Command, Army Materiel Command, USCENTCOM, and the Defense Logistics Agency to support Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. The CDDOC provides USCENTCOM a significant improvement in the management of its distribution network. It synchronizes all deployment and distribution functions to include: executing the CCDR's deployment, redeployment, and distribution priorities; provides Total Asset Visibility (TAV) and ITV over force flow, sustainment, and retrograde; manages and develops theater distribution architecture in concert with the Services and Joint Staff; synchronizes strategic and operational distribution within the theater and national logistics agencies; establishes distribution performance measures at the operational and strategic levels; manages and oversees container, airlift equipment (air pallets and nets), Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tag, and other intermodal systems.³³

The CDDOC is limited only by the functional experts assigned to its staff and mission responsibilities delegated by the combatant command J-4. The CDDOC derives its mission authority from the CCDR's approval to execute DAFL. As a result of its recent success in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR), CCDRs such as U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), have established a Joint Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (JDDOC), with assistance from USTRANSCOM. Some senior logisticians believe that the JDDOC concept is the right organizational construct to resolve the joint logistics management and control problem. Indeed the organizational design achieves the three imperatives of future joint logistics vision outlined by existing doctrine: unity of effort, domain-wide visibility, and rapid and precise response.³⁴ However, the JDDOC cannot conduct JTLM or serve as a joint logistics command headquarters. The JDDOC structure augments the CCDR's J-4 as a theater plug. Therefore, the logistics operations and mobility functions require clear lines of demarcation. Despite the great success of the CDDOC in bridging the strategic-operational air and sea distribution gap, some areas, such as directive authority over surface transportation, still rest with the Services or components for management.³⁵

The most promising joint solution for the CCDR is the Joint Force Support Component Command (JFSCC). It is designed to provide centralized JTLM using a single logistics command with enhanced joint capabilities to coordinate, integrate, and synchronize theater logistics functions.³⁶ This initiative is an experimental, ongoing effort of United States Forces Korea (USFK) and maximizes the existing logistics structure of the U.S. Army's 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC), formerly

the 19th Theater Support Command, as the core of the organization. The JFSCC demonstrates great potential to bridge the gap between operational and strategic-theater level logistics while integrating joint logistics structure, and could serve at CCDR level.

This option is specifically structured to synchronize operational-level JTLM through the establishment of a fusion center, integrating the various defense, strategic enablers, for example the JDDOC and DLA cell, to include a large plans cell, and a distribution and management element for commodities.³⁷ In short, the scalable organizational structure gives the JFC that singular point of command and control for joint logistics within the AOR. This capability brings together strategic-operational capabilities, the Service components, and coalition partners. Upon the CCDR delegation of DAFL, the JFSCC can direct sustainment activities for Service components, functional agencies, and national elements within the task organization. The JFSCC can coordinate across Service lines, maintaining contact with supporting commands, Service, and national military support agencies, regional host nations, and national and international interagency participants as required. The JFSCC can effectively integrate each of the organization's specific staff responsibilities, functions, and processes through collaboration in order to maximize logistics planning and execution.

The Combined Logistics Command or Center (CLC) is a variation or expanded option of the JFSCC.³⁸ The key difference of the CLC, in contrast to the JFSCC, is it provides an added capability to manage coalition logistics which facilitates the synchronization of combined operations and logistics support. It possesses the capability to conduct distribution and commodity management functions in the most

challenging JTLM environment. The CLC can also assist in both theater-strategic and operational-level logistical course-of-action development by conducting a logistical analysis of assigned tasks in the area of operations. USFK experimented with this expanded option, calling it the Combined Joint Force Support Component Command (CJFSCC) during the Unified Quest '05 war game. The CLC is still under development in USFK; however, it does have the potential to replicate many of the functions found in a CJFSCC.³⁹ The CLC could be a viable, alternative solution for the integration of coalition support operations to synchronize the logistical management of JIIM operations, since it contains the critical core functions required for a joint-based distribution management center.

Implications for Support of JIIM Operations

Future military operations will continue to employ joint and combined military forces. These operations are taking its toll on the U.S. military in both dollars and readiness. Moreover, the changing missions and rapid pace of technology are increasingly influencing how military logisticians conduct business leveraging resources in the JIIM environment. The addition of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) and other sophisticated, interagency organizations introduces a new dimension of complexity supporting interagency and intergovernmental organizations in the JLE. Emerging doctrine for counterinsurgency acknowledges, "Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgency do not shoot."⁴⁰ The demands in the current operating environment emphasize the importance of unique skill sets that range from law enforcement to the restoration of electrical power. These require joint logistics support in some way.

However, developing an adaptive, joint, military logistics system remains a daunting task. Planning, and conducting, JIIM-distribution-based operations is a difficult process considering the unique missions of each of the organizations involved, especially as the U.S. increasingly leverages other elements of power in the GCC's AORs.

Although there has been much discussion on transformation in joint warfighting, little is written on doctrinal transformation in JIIM-based JTLM. If the U.S. fails to establish a JFSCC or CJFSCC in each GCC AOR, the challenges of the dynamic operating environment will draw inefficiently and ineffectively from the limited defense logistics resources.

Conclusion

Military logisticians operate in a time-space and information-sensitive environment; they must plan, anticipate, forecast, and execute critical support in joint and combined environments. The current military logistics force structure is decentralized due to Service-specific support requirements; at times, an ineffective logistical support system falls short to achieve the three future joint logistics imperatives.⁴¹ Logistical lessons learned during the previous decade demonstrate the necessity for the U.S. Armed Forces to reform and modernize military logistics.

Streamlining the Service's logistics at all echelons will take a minimum of at least five years due to current equipment, doctrine, and processes. Keeping these factors in mind, one must incrementally reform the joint military logistics system without incurring high levels of risks. Therefore, totally revamping the military logistics system from top to bottom in a short period of time would do more harm than good.

A gradual approach would allow all stakeholders to change at their own pace, in the best interest of their Service. However, unless the U.S. Armed Forces implement some reform, their joint military logistics system, will not support the demands of changing missions and roles associated with evolving core competencies.

The best option to reform the existing military logistics system is through careful restructuring of flexible service logistics organizations, ultimately able to support complete JIIM operations. The scalable design of the JFSCC or CJFSCC is an effective mechanism to conduct JTLM for the CCDRs. The U.S. Army's ESC and TSC organizations must continue to develop their doctrine and refine their organizational design beyond their Title X functions. The current, proposed organizational structure of the TSC is confined by U.S. Army Title X design, limiting joint integration.⁴² The TSC and ESC design must have a tailored Joint Manning Document (JMD) similar to the modular U.S. Army Division or Corps Headquarters JTF model. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), may need to examine and broker resourcing for a permanent implementation which includes the other services, interagency, and intergovernmental participants to serve in the GCC AORs.

The time has come to transform joint military logistics. In this era of persistent conflict and developing missions, the U.S. Armed Forces must change doctrinal and service logistic organizational structures. In effect, senior leaders have an opportunity to improve JTLM using the scalable JFSCC or CJFSCC structure that can perform Joint, Combined, JIIM-based distribution management functions. Integration of theater-strategic and operational-defense level, logistical organizations will ensure the efficient use of resources to provide focused logistics to all our Services and partners leveraging

elements of power. The joint integration from the services and combat support agencies will improve the link to national strategic, operational, and tactical logistics, synchronizing distribution from “factory to the foxhole” logistics support. As we progress into the 21st Century, the prospects of new technology and greater efficiencies are brighter than ever. Capitalizing on technologies and affecting change will ensure success in the joint military logistics system DOD seeks to build.

The transformation of the defense system since the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act has resulted in many successes through the end of the Cold War, making the use of military resources a key element of national power. However, the days of the large, conventional cold war military threat have long passed. The past six years engaged in the GWOT have strained national resources while the world remains volatile and uncertain. The rising global demand for critical resources and demographic shifts is increasing the potential for future conflict. Therefore, the U.S. should further refine its joint military logistics structures to support joint, combined, and JIIM-distribution-based systems to integrate the U.S. military with other elements of power. The U.S. must maximize its “world-class” logistics capabilities through intelligent planning and integration using all the tools at its disposal.

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